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Title: Do Terrorist Attacks leave an identifiable ‘fingerprint’ on international tourist arrival 
data?  
Abstract 
This article empirically examines the postulated effects of at least a single terrorist 
attack on the measure of monthly international arrivals. The study uses the tsoutliers R 
package to detect outliers in time series data following terrorist attacks in five 
destinations. The contribution of this paper is found in the methodological approach that 
was implemented consistently across all five destinations. The findings suggest that 
there is no evidence to support the view that there is a consistent disturbance from a 
well-fitted time series (a data ‘fingerprint’) created by a terrorist attack across the five 
different destinations or even, in at least one case, in the same destination, at different 
times.  
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Introduction, 
Tourism demand, although incredibly resilient at the global level, can be highly volatile 
at the destination level. The flow of international arrivals is susceptible to shocks, such 
as terrorist attacks (Coshall 2009, Bhattarai et al., 2005, Brooks 2004, Coshall 2003, 
Chavez and Tynon 2000, Gartner and Dhen 1992). Over the past two decades, the 
nature of terrorist attacks has changed, bringing with that change significant impacts 
and implications (Chomsky, 2008). Quantitatively, the changes can be seen in the 
increasing frequency of attacks and their resulting fatalities.  Qualitatively, the changes 
are evident in some radical differences in terms of the objectives and motivations of the 
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perpetrators. These attacks generated significant media coverage and attracted 
considerable interest from both the management point of view, dealing with the 
aftermath, and from researchers trying to understand the impacts on different economic 
sectors and indicators. 
Numerous econometric studies over the past two decades have examined the 
quantitative impacts of terrorism on economic growth. For example, Enders and Sandler 
presented a number of studies looking at policy intervention and patterns of 
international terrorism being the pinnacle of these studies in 2000. The macroeconomic 
consequences of international terrorism was assessed in a study by Bloomberg et al. 
(2003) with Eckstein and Tsiddon (2003) looking at the effects on output per capita and  
the effects on international trade was evaluated by Nitsch and Schumacher (2004). 
Chen and Siems (2003) examined global capital markets and per capita GDP was 
studied by Abadie and Gardeazabel (2003). Eldor and Melnick (2004) focused on the 
impacts on stock and foreign exchange markets. Utility losses were examined by Frey 
et al. (2007) and effects on income per capita by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) while  
Choise (2014) evaluated whether or not economic growth exerts a dampening effect on 
terrorism. These studies used a wide range of statistical methods, including but not 
limited to; panel statistics, time series, and event study methods using excess returns 
approach, subjective well-being data, cross-sectional and panel growth regression 
analysis, structural VAR modelling, estimation methodologies (e.g.), the Blanchard-
Yaari model, placebo studies and multiple regression, cross national, time series 
analysis. The results generate a mixture of results, with some reporting losses, others 
suggesting negligible or no loss at all. 
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In particular, there have been a number of studies investigating the impact of terrorism 
on tourism activities (i.e. Sandler 2015, Minton 2011, Coshal 2009, Fletcher and 
Morakabati 2008, Morakabati  2007, Drakos and Kutan 2003, Pizam  and Fleischer 
2002, and Sandler 1991). For example, Enders and Sanders 1(1991) suggest that 
terrorist attacks had significant effects on tourist arrivals in Spain. Pizam and Fleischer 
(2002) found the impact of an attack on the number of tourists entering Israel had a time 
lag of between three to nine months, whereas others, such as Coshall (2003) examining 
air travel, argued that the effect was immediate, but lasted only three to four months. 
Studies examining the conflict between Israel and Palestinian suggested one – off 
terrorist had no effect, or at worst a short term effect (Fleischer and Buccola 2002; 
Mansfeld 1999; Pizam and Fleischer 2002).  The frequency and severity of attacks 
(Pizam 1999), their location and prevention all play an important part in determining the 
impact of a terrorist attack. However, the results of these studies and the methodologies 
employed have not been sufficiently consistent to identify whether or not there is any 
predictable effect of a terrorist attack on the flow of visitor arrivals and this makes it 
challenging to generalize from these findings.  
 
The emergence of a growing literature on destination resilience illustrates that there is a 
considerable interest to understand the impact and recovery cycle and how 
preparedness and resilience may help reduce vulnerability. This study is unique in using 
a consistent methodology to test the disturbance to a time series of monthly arrivals 
created by at least a single, religiously motivated, terrorist attack (study hypothesis) in 
                                                          
1 Their study however, examined different types of terrorism in early 90s. 
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both developed and developing countries. The study seeks to determine whether there 
exists a ‘fingerprint’ or ‘signature’ pattern of terrorist effects, using tsoutliers R package, 
to detect outliers in time series data (Lopez-de-Lacalle 2014).  Although this feature has 
been modelled, generically, to understand how systems recover, following a terrorist 
attack (Haimes 2015), this has not been done specifically with respect to the recovery 
times of international tourist arrivals.  Our main research question is: Do terrorist attacks 
affect the flow of international tourist arrivals in destinations in the same way? 
Therefore, this study looks for a data ‘fingerprint’ of terrorist attack effects, in 
international arrivals data as they fall and recover. 
 
In the following section we provide an overview as to why demand might fall following a 
terrorist attack, before moving on to examine how it falls, in terms of the magnitude and 
the time needed for recovery. Therefore, terrorism, intergroup conflict and fear are 
examined, to reflect on the relationship between fear and travel behaviour.  The paper 
then sets out the methodological approach used before moving on to the analyses to 
determine whether on to there is an identifiable fingerprint left in the changes in tourist 
arrivals data and the implications of the findings for policy-makers and planners.  
 
Terrorism, intergroup conflict and fear 
Prior to the millennium, terrorist attacks were responsible for around 2.4 fatalities per 
attack (Barros and Proenca 2005).   However, 9/11 was a game-changer, driving up 
fatalities from 400-500 a year, to just under of 3,000 in a matter of minutes (US 
Department of State 1989-2000, in Enders and Sandler 2001).  The 9/11 attack inspired 
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a series of terrorist attacks (see table 1) and in cases where westerners or those who 
politically share close ties to westerners have attracted significant media coverage.  
 
Table 1: near here 
Religiously motivated terrorist attacks, towards the late 90s, introduced a major shift 
from nationalism, separatism, Marxist, nihilism and economics motivations (Mickolus et 
al. 1993, Hoffman 1997, Enders and Sandler 2000) to a more general religious-based 
platform. This type of terrorism is not novel and has a pedigree dating back to the 11th 
century, sharing similarities with the actions of Assassins. Ideologically they claim they 
are using an old approach (pure) towards religion. In this way it means that terrorist 
groups can recruit individuals to fight ‘the modern day crusaders from a decadent 
western society’ (Enders and Sandler 2000). In spite of their claim it is worth mentioning 
that they have killed more within the same religion that they suggest they are defending, 
than from other religions.  
 
In terms of impact of their attacks, Fischer et al (2010:9) distinguishes between 
“attributes of terrorism (e.g., motives, socio-economic background, intentions, culture), 
attributes of the attack (e.g., type, weapons chosen, target, cruelty) and attributes of 
their recipients” (e.g. socio-economic and cultural background). They argue it is these 
attributes that form a picture in the minds of individuals and determines how they 





In this context the motivation of attacks is important because those attacks based on 
religious motivations may have less risk averse perpetrators. Some suggest that these 
individuals see their role as martyrs and the death of ‘non-believers’ is justified, thus 
generating greater concern for travellers (Hinnant et al. 2015, Schmitt 2015, Sayare 
2011).   
 
Religiously motivated terrorist attacks bring significant social impacts (which may affect 
economic impacts), because perpetrators stamp ‘religion’ as their legitimacy for 
attacking and, in so doing, generating strong elements of “social identity”. This social 
identity is not necessarily similar to their recipient‘s socio–cultural background, i.e. 
westerners, who tend to be the main generating markets for tourism. Social identity 
theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) suggests that people define themselves according to 
the group(s) to which they belong and where they share the same perceptions. This not 
only creates a sense of belonging and self-image, but also provides a perspective 
towards ‘other groups’, referred to as “out-groups”.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest 
that social identity theory holds three distinctive categories; social categorisation, social 
identification and social comparison. Tajfel (1974, 1978) used theories of social 
comparison, social psychological differentiation and social identity to hypothesise that 
behaviour is determined in terms of groups rather than self (Carins 1982, in Tajfel 
1982). Humans are born categorisers, in the sense that they keep searching for 
patterns in the world around them, because it enables them to generalise and predict 
outcomes with limited information. Therefore, individuals tend to structure their social 
environment in terms of groupings of people, or social categories, in order to simplify 
7 
 
the world in which they live (Tajfel 1978). In the absence of full information, the danger 
is that humans will categorise people or events into the same category to fill any gap in 
knowledge.  
 
In conflict theory (Sherif and Sherif, 1953, Bruner and Perlmutter 1957, LeVine and 
Campbell 1972), the notion of social differentiation (in-group/out-group) provides fertile 
ground for conflict (Brewer 1999). Brewer (1999) argues that the foundation of in-group 
formation and loyalty could encourage notions of moral superiority, fear and distrust of 
out-groups, social comparisons and power politics. This then could lead to hatred, 
contempt, hostility and conflicts towards the out-group(s) (Sumner 1906, Allport 1954, 
Bewer 1999) thereby elevating fear levels.  
Indeed, religious identity is a powerful social identity, underpinned by fundamental 
beliefs and values (Beit-Hallahmi 2015, Ysseldyk et al. 2010).  The ability of religion to 
serve the human identity instinct might explain why, having a shared religion during a 
state of conflict, is an influential aspect of group perceptions (1972, Dion and Warn 
1975, Seul 1999, Storm 2013). The literature suggests “political ambivalence of religion” 
(Ben-Nun Bloom et.al 2015) can induce both conflict and cooperation (i.e. encouraging 
contingent altruism) (Norenzayan 2014, Appleby 2000, Philpot 2007), suggesting 
religion has a tendency to increase the probability of outgroups being seen as 
threatening. This can create extra fear compared with similar act if committed within the 
group (Branscombe et al. 1999, Haslam and Reicher 2006, Norenzayan 2014).  
The relationship between acts of terrorism and the level of fear generated is complex 
and non-linear. Scientific prediction employs series of rules to predict outcomes (Hayek 
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1967).  The challenge of evaluating risk perception and fear levels, particularly at the 
individual level, is immense. Slovic and Weber (2002) identify three components of risk; 
identification, quantification and characterization of threats.  The terrorism of the 21st 
century involves “intelligent and motivated opponent[s]” (Slovic and Weber, 2002:2) who 
target civilians indiscriminately. This not only makes prediction more challenging, it can 
elevate irrational and exaggerated fear in the minds of potential travellers. Because the 
event is unknown, the outcome cannot be predicted (Sayer 1984, Yeung 1997, De Roo 
2012). For many, this means they bridge the ‘gap of uncertainty’ based on their 
cognitive understanding of the situation (Morakabati and Kapuscinski 2016).  
 
Responses to the fear of terrorist attacks may vary between different psychographic 
groups (Morakabati and Kapuscinski 2016) or at least vary according to the level of risk 
perceptions between individuals. Overall, the impact of terrorist attacks on destinations 
is a trade-off between the force of a terrorist attack and the destination resilience, with 
individual factors acting as part of a destination’s resilience.  In a study of a destination’s 
sustainability framework, Calgaro et al. (2014: 361) outlined a series of generic factors 
affecting destination’s vulnerabilities such as “geographical exposure, destination 
specific development characteristics, social structure and governance process”. 
Similarly, here we suggest that the destination resilience factors (Tierney 1997, Comfort 
1999, Petak 2002, Rose 2004a, Rose et al. 2004b, Rose et al 2007, Fischer et al (2010, 
NRC 2011 and  2013,  Hallegatte 2014) can be divided into three categories; terrorist-
attack attributes; destination attributes, recipient attributes and destination management 
(See Figure 1). 
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In spite of the fact that the multitude of factors makes it impossible to translate one’s 
theoretical knowledge into a prediction, it is possible to deduce an indicative outcome, 
notwithstanding departures from normal responses by the agents involved, using a 
degree of explanation, by going from the known to the unknown (Hayek 1967). So going 
from known to unknown, the destination, terrorist attack, terrorist and recipient attributes 
plus destination management, can all affect destination resilience.  However, the key 
question is what does the impact and recovery path of a single effect look like. The 
following section explains the methodology used to measure the impact and the recover 
cycle in five destinations.  
Methodology 
This study examines the effect of at least a single [1] terrorist attack on the measure of 
tourist arrivals over time. The hypothesis is that a terrorist attack will disturb a well-fitted 
time series, by creating a negative level shift and a temporary decrease in the number 
of international arrivals, followed by a gradual recovery.   To put this into context, 
studies by Sandlers and Enders (1991, 2005) suggest there is a negative effect of 
terrorism on tourist arrivals.  Darkos and Kutan (2005) claimed that both the severity 
and frequency of terrorist attacks are inversely related to tourism demand.  Pizam and 
Fleischer (2002) suggest that the frequency of terrorist attacks has a longer lasting 
effect than their severity. These studies imply, to some extent, a level of predictability 
and relate to the 1990s (when the nature of terrorist attacks was different to what they 
are in the 21st century). They are also based on one or two case studies (as these were 
all that were available at the time).  These studies provide useful, but insufficient, insight 
                                                          
[1] For the case of Bali we looked at the effect several negative events including two terrorist attacks. 
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to the effects on the flow of arrivals. Later on, Morakabati (2007) observed, but did not 
test, five tourist destinations, which were subjected to religious-related terrorist attacks.  
The absence of any systematic studies using a common framework encouraged us to 
seek examples of destinations where at least one terrorist attack had occurred since 
2000.  
Cryer and Chen (2008) showed that the effects of 9/11 on air miles can be modelled 
using a parsimonious ARIMA and a transfer function, which took on the profile of an 
initial negative level shift, followed by exponential recovery. The challenge of this 
approach is that the researcher either needs a hypothesis about a specific transfer 
function, or must engage in a protracted, heuristic, fitting process.  Chen and Liu (1993) 
argued that if the location and dynamic pattern of an event are unknown, then an 
intervention model of the kind proposed by Box and Tia (1975) is appropriate. However, 
when these are imperfectly known, then disturbances to a time series might be better 
thought of, less specifically, as being outliers. 
 
Building on the latter idea, this study explores if a terrorist attack creates a time series 
disturbance and leaves a recognisable data ‘signature[2]’ (referred to in this study as a 
fingerprint) in the form of a pattern of outliers, coeval with the time of its occurrence. 
This fingerprint might be detectable by an automatic procedure, removing some of the 
subjectivity of the more prescriptive approaches. Such a procedure is available using 
the 'tsoutliers' R package (Lopez-de-Lacalle 2014), namely the automatic outlier 
                                                          
[2] By signature in this study we refer to a  pattern of AO, TC and LS outliers initiated at the time of the event.  
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detection function, tso. This function (tso) examines disturbances from the mean value 
of the dependent variable (monthly international arrivals) which has been fitted using an 
ARIMA model. This procedure allows tso to distinguish these disturbances as AO 
(additive outliers, which show isolated spikes), TC (temporary changes, which are 
spikes that take a few periods to disappear) and LS (level shifts, which is where there is 
a step function) (Lopez-de-Lacalle, 2014). tso fits transfer function terms, corresponding 
to these outlier terms and  includes them as independent variables in the ARIMA model. 
tso computes t-statistics for the coefficient associated with each of these terms and 
uses a threshold value (the argument “cval”), which a disturbance must exceed, to 
qualify as an outlier for inclusion in the model.  This study initially used the default cval = 
3.5 as Lopez-de-Lacalle suggests (see Lopez-de-Lacalle 2014: 8). In these analyses, 
tso identified several outliers exceeding the set threshold. 
tso time-plots show the path of a disturbance in a way that is readily mapped onto the 
chronology of an event, or events.  We define a terrorist attack fingerprint as a group of 
contiguous outliers, showing the general property of a rapid decrease in arrivals, 
followed by a relatively slow recovery, initiated soon after the date of the attack. The 
analysis used the default arguments but included first order, seasonal and non-seasonal 
difference terms to model the linear trend.  Natural logarithms of monthly arrivals were 
taken in all examples to stabilize variance.  A set of monthly international arrivals (IA) 
data were selected for analysis if they met all of the following criteria: 
• At least one religious-motivated type of terrorist attacks since 2000  
• Samples were tourist destinations  
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• Westerners and those politically similar, in particular media is significantly more 
reactive when westerns are targets, for many reasons such as because they are 
westerners, and importance of religious identity, the west is home to some of the 
media giants and overall because these are major tourism market. 
• Availability of sufficient observations before, and after the event, to help establish 
a model, before the event and to examine recovery.  
 
USA, Bali, Spain, UK and India met these criteria. Each analysis applied tso to the full 
time series available.  The results of these analyses are in the following section. 
 
Empirical Results 
The results are shown using a model that demonstrates the effect, on a destination-by-
destination basis, producing a plot and table of estimates to show the possible outliers,  
their types  and location, to examine the ‘fingerprint’ of a terrorist attack on arrival 
numbers.   
 
Figure 2 is based on USA data, the tso function plots monthly USA data over the period 
(Y= International Tourism Arrivals In (IA) from 19992-2014. The top half of Figure 2 
shows the original time series in grey; the blue curve shows what the model would have 
looked like when the effects of the detected outliers are removed (the fitted model) and 
the location of the detected outliers (red points).  The lower half of the plot (figure 2) 
shows the AO, TC and LS which can be seen as the data fingerprint of the terrorist 
                                                          
2 This means observation one will be January 1999 and observation 69 will be September 2001 
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attack on IA.  AO is observed as an instantaneous down and up:  decrease and 
recovery in a brief period of time (one unit of time – a month in this study). TC is shown 
as an instantaneous decrease, with exponential recovery characterised by the half-life 
(slowly decaying recovery with the property of an exponential function). Finally, LS is 
shown as a negative level, or step, change that lasts more than a month. Arrivals carry 
on at the new level until something else happens.  This study identifies sequential 
combinations of these outliers, if their onset coincides with a terrorist attack (TA), as  a 
pattern, or fingerprint of  changes.   
 
Figure 2: near here  
Table 2, reports the ARIMA (0, 1, 2) (0, 1, 1) that best fits the series. The results 
suggest that the 9/11 effect is significant and produces a data ‘fingerprint’ effect with 
four negative TC and LS (see figure 2) being observed. A strong LS is detected at 
observation 69(2001:9).   
 
Table 2: near here  
 
In terms of International Arrivals (IA) the September 9/11 data (2.61 m, see table 2) 
show a drop of 32%, from the figure recorded the previous September (2000, 3.58 
million) and the three months’ average (months 9, 10, 11) shows a further drop of 35%.  
This is followed by a TC in the following month’s at observation 70 (2001:10) and a 
second TC at 87 (2003:3), indicating the possible effect of the Iraq War led by the USA 
and the UK. The second LS, at 109 (2005:1), suggests substantive effects, where it 
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starts regaining the losses as it moves towards January 2005. September 2005, four 
years after the attack, the data shows a healthy recovery (see figure 1 and table 2) 
where the number of IA exceeds the pre-event level. Figure 3 shows the tso function 
plot for Bali monthly IA data for the period from 1999-2014. 
 
 Figure 3: near here  
 
ARIMA (1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1) has been specified to fit the series. The results suggest that the 
effect of the Bali terrorist attack (12.10.2002) is significant and the fingerprint effect of 
the terrorist attack shows several LS and TC and AO (see figure 3 and table 3). 
 
Table 3: near here  
 
A strong TC was detected at 2002:10 (see Table 3), showing a drop of 15% over the 
same month the previous year. The three-month average comparison of post event 
2002, suggests a decrease of 31% over the same months the previous year (in 2001). 
This was followed by five negative AOs during the next year. Observation 52 (2003:04) 
indicates a second TC related to the impact of SARS on Indonesia and the whole 
region, from this point the pattern of outliers suggests a positive decay effect with signs 
of recovery towards the end of 2003, indicating a recovery time of approximately 15 
months from both the Bali bombing and SARS.   A third negative TC at observation 62 
disrupted this trend (2004:02) which could reflect the attack in mainland Indonesia in 
December 2003. From this point on, no further outliers were found until the second 
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attack in Bali in October 2005, suggesting that the Tsunami did not have any 
measureable effect on Bali.  The second terrorist attack was followed by a strong 
negative LS at observation 82 in (2005:10). This was followed by two positive LS at 
respectively, 6 and 13 month periods, these figures suggest substantive effects where 
losses are regained between the mid and end of 2006. It is notable that the types of 
outliers differ from case to case, even within same the same destination, while first Bali 
bombing created AO and TC types of outliers, the second one created a level shift (LS). 
These results also show the cumulative effects of negative events on a destination.  
 
For Bali, there are additional (subsequent) events across Indonesia that may have 
diluted the effect of the first and the largest terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002.  The 
Indonesian government uses isolated marketing to sell Bali, distancing it from the rest of 
Indonesia and the region (similar to the way that the Red Sea has been marketed by 
Egypt), which has been subjected to two other major events, SARS in 2003 and the 
Tsunami in December 2004 (there were also 5 smaller terrorist attacks across 
Indonesia). Neither of the two major events directly affected Bali, but tourists tend to 
paint their geography with broad brushes and so some effect may occur. There was 
also a second terrorist attack in October 2005 in Bali and it would be naïve to claim the 
effects were isolated. 
 
Figure 4 shows the tso function produces a plot for monthly IA data for India, for the 
period 2005-2013 with observation 36 presenting the IA in December 2008. The same 
ARIMA (1,1,1)(2,1,1)  for Bali was found to fit the series. The results suggest that the 
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effect of the Mumbai terrorist attack (26-29.10.2008) is significant, but short-lived, TC 
shows the data fingerprint effect of the attack.  
 
 
Figure 4: near here  
 
Table 4: near here  
 
A moderate decaying function (TC) was detected at observation 36 (2008:12), with no 
other outliers following. This suggests IA starts to regain the losses in May 2008, less 
than 6 months after the attack, with an approximate loss of 265,273 tourists. 
In examining the impact of terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 
2005), no outliers were detected using this approach (see figure 5 and 6) 
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Figure 5: near here  
 
Figure 6 : near here  
 
To explore the data more closely in search of an effect, the default critical value (cval) 
was reduced from 3.5 to 2.9 but this did not uncover any evidence of disturbance from 
the mean value of the dependent variable (IA).  This means there were no t statistics 




The literature suggests that the risk of a terrorist attack creates fear and the evidence 
suggests that fear is more profound when the perpetrators are from an out-group and 
that religion is a strong demarcation factor (Hinnant et al. 2015, Sayare 2011, Schmitt 
2015).  The findings of this study display that there are some predictable effects relating 
to a terrorist attack, but the effects of the attacks are unpredictable because they 
produce different data fingerprints in terms of the disturbance and recovery of 
international arrivals i.e. different types of outliers and different recovery periods.    
 
The results show that an event as large as the attack in the USA required a long term 
recovery period, arrivals regaining their losses in around January 2005, a period of 
almost 4 years. The unprecedented scale and design of the attack, the shock factor, 
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and subsequent ‘war on terror’ could all be responsible for this long-term recovery 
period.  
 
The event of 9/11 and the resulting USA ‘war on terror’, which Bush also referred to 
initially as a ‘crusade’ only to later apologise for using that term (Bush 17.09.01) created 
a binary world of ‘them and us’. The terrorist attacks of the 21st century, combined with 
this binary stance taken by the USA and many European countries, including the UK, 
have led to a form of classical conditioning where there is a unifying front for the 'in-
group' and a growing concern about the people seen as belonging to the 'out-group'.  
Arguably, the American response following the 9/11 attacks elevated the level of fear 
across the world, reducing tourism demand in some areas, and shifting demand to other 
destinations, creating some regionalisation in travel patterns (Scott and Jafari 2010).  
 
While the overall turbulent period for Bali also took around 4 years, this was more likely 
the result of a succession of negative events, between 2002 and 2005. The 2002 attack 
in Bali directly targeted international tourists, the hospitality sector and the heart of 
tourism in Indonesia, where tourism acts like an engine for the economy of this 
developing island (Fletcher et al. 2013).  Tourists are soft targets and attacks on them 
create greater reactions and publicity and hence greater perceptions of risk. Looking at 
destination attributes, although Bali is predominately governed by a non-Muslim 
majority, Indonesia as a whole is home to the largest Muslim population, globally.  The 
distance between host and guest culture, particularly in the context of religious identity 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979) can result in the perception of a struggle between ‘them’ and 
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‘us’ as reflected in the Travelzoo survey data (2015, see Paris 2015). Tourists to Bali 
arrive from culturally different backgrounds to the island's population and so the lack of 
familiarity and large socio-cultural differences may contribute to greater levels of the 
'unknown' and lower “contingent altruism” and hinder destination resilience (Brewer 
1999, Appleby 2000; Philpot 2007, Norenzayan 2014).  This suggests that there is 
unlikely to be the rallying effect that was evident following the attacks in New York, 
London and Madrid. In addition, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office advice on not 
travelling to the island amplified the effects on the number of tourist arrivals even 
further. If this on its own was not enough to damage arrivals and recovery time, for Bali 
there was a composite sequence of both man-made and natural events that hindered 
recovery. The initial terrorist attack in Bali generated only a TC, however, the follow-on 
events with further terrorist attacks in 2005, created a significant level shift where it took 
a year for the recovery to occur in 2006. 
 
The effect of the Mumbai terrorist attack in India was significant with temporary changes 
over a period of less than six months. In this case, although the perpetrators claimed to 
be Islamist, the media suggested this was a dispute between India and Pakistan 
(Ramesh et al. 2008).  The fact that tourists were caught up in the event has been 
explained as people being in the wrong place at the wrong time, as opposed to tourists 
being the specific targets.  
 
For the UK and Spain data, no outliers were found and therefore no significant effects. 
The attack in Spain targeted the capital city and its transportation system. Madrid 
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receives business as well as leisure tourists and is the sixth most popular destination for 
international tourist arrivals in the country. As a major urban area, it receives a diverse 
portfolio of visitors, bringing greater resilience, and projects a greater image of safety 
and control, encouraging confidence and recovery. The ongoing terrorist threats, over 
many years, from the ETA campaigns, also means that Spain is more prepared and 
responsive to such events.   Europeans account for 90% of the international arrivals to 
Madrid, from a range of source markets, the number of arrivals recovered quickly, and a 
rallying effect was evident such as that following the more recent attacks in Paris.  
 
The case for the UK was similar to Madrid (European capital and transport system 
attacked) and no data fingerprint effect was detected. The major difference between the 
attacks in Madrid and London, from the point of view of the tourism industry, is that 
London is a major gateway for tourists coming into the UK, whereas Madrid receives 
only around 7% of the total tourist arrivals to Spain. There were also suggestions that, 
after the bombing in the UK, many people’s attitudes hardened and became more 
resilient, since such attacks have become familiar and the bombings do not change the 
risk of travel (e.g. Rand Morimoto 2005, Frangialli 2005). The challenges of 
understanding how people perceive risk and fear, the complexity attached to a 
destination as an open system (Leiper 1995) makes it inherently challenging to predict 
the impact of a terrorist attack to a destination. Additionally, Kennedy 2005 and  Esobles 
2005 argued that the British emergency forces responded effectively to the attack 
(Kennedy 2005, Esobles 2005).  The result in London was that within less than a month, 
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the arrival figures were back to higher levels than the corresponding month the previous 
year.   
 
The analysis suggests that terrorist attacks seem to have a larger effect in developing 
countries than in large European capitals. Industrialized economies often have more 
developed communication and security legislation in place, greater stability, and are 
better able to mitigate the damage and restore confidence because of that control 
(Pizam 1999, Darkus and Kutan 2001, Coombs 2004, Frey et al. 2004, Bruck and 
Wickstrom 2004, Morakabati 2007, Baker 2011, Philo 2012). This is partly because of 
their preparedness and history of planning for terrorist attacks and the diverse range of 
visitor markets. In terms of the impact and implication of such attacks, there is a greater 
economic implication for places like Bali where the contribution of tourism to GDP and 
dependence upon it is far greater than in industrialized and urban economies where 
there is greater level of control and a more diversified economy. Industrialized 
economies tend to be more robust, the economy is not dominated by tourism or a few 
sectors such as agriculture or oil and gas extraction, suggesting that terrorist attacks will 
have a much greater economic and long run effect where these industries dominate. 
There are other implications when terrorist attacks impact upon the availability of local 
jobs and where there are high levels of unemployment.  Poverty and unemployment 
enhance the recruitment campaigns of terrorist groups (Lowen 2014, Muir 2016). 
Therefore, overdependence on tourism potentially creates vulnerability and so 
economic diversification needs to be viewed as part of place resilience strategies. Yet, 
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diversification requires large sums of capital, which is often scarce in the developing 
world (Morakabati and Fletcher 2014). 
 
Conclusion and implications  
Fear is the bitter taste of risk and the seed of uncertainty, the fruit of which is harm 
avoidance, which brings with it economic consequences.  The purpose of this study was 
to use a consistent methodology to examine the single effects of terrorist attacks on the 
measure of international tourism arrivals across five destinations. This discussion re-
visited existing assumptions and assertions about the effects of terrorism on tourism, as 
suggested by some studies (e.g. Darkos and Kutan 2003, Fleischer and Buccola 2002, 
Mansfeld 1999, Pizam and Fleischer 2002).  This study used the measure of 
international monthly arrivals across the five case studies (using tsoutlier R for detection 
of outliers in time series) to search for evidence that there is a consistent fingerprint in 
different destinations.  
 
The findings show a mixture of results, supporting previous studies in some cases, but 
not all. The findings from this pilot study contribute to the literature and enhance our 
understanding of the impacts of a terrorist attack. The principal theoretical implication of 
this study is that no two-terrorism attacks leave the same data fingerprint. The study 
could find no evidence of a data fingerprint that was consistent across different 
destinations or even, in at least one case, in the same destination over time.    A key 
strength of this study is found in the novel application of classical time series with a 
contemporary twist (Lopez-de-Lacalle 2014) and  the introduction of the notion of a 
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“data fingerprint“ in terms of the pattern of the data effects of terrorism on international 
arrivals in a set of case studies.   
 
The arguments presented from a theoretical perspective, reveal the complexity 
associated with predicting and identifying effects (see figure 1), suggesting that the 
magnitude and recovery profile of effects varies depending on an array of variables with 
varying power, as explained in destination resilience.    Overall, the findings show that 
European capitals tend to be more resilient than destinations in non-industrialised 
countries where the latter have a higher likelihood of experiencing significant effects.  
 
Additionally from a theoretical point of view, the study suggests that the impact of a 
terrorist attack on the risk perception of a population could be greater, when the 
religious platform used to motivate the attack is the primary religion of the place, and is 
at odds with the religion of the majority of tourists. In 2015 Travelzoo found that 75% of 
British holidaymakers said they would avoid traveling to Muslim countries following the 
attack in Tunisia (based on a survey of 2,000 households).  The combination of religious 
identity (Beit-Hallahmi 2015, Ysseldyk et al. 2010) with realistic conflict theory (Sherif 
and Sherif, 1953, Bruner and Perlmutter 1957, LeVine and Campbell) and suggestions 
by (Sumner 1906, Allport 1954 and Brewer 1999) can explain such a response.   
Contrary to the micro effects of terrorism and making the effect more place dependent , 
the macro effect of  international terrorist 'brands', such as ISIS, have increased their 
media profile and associated uncertainty levels (Global Terrorism Index 2015) making 




There are a number of implications for the industry. In particular this study suggests that 
when predicting the outcome of attacks on tourist arrivals and the recovery period, it is 
important to determine the power of each variable (figure 1) and their interdependence 
as well as their functional relationships (Calgaro, Lloyd and Dominey-Howes 2014, Bec 
and Dredge 2014).  Familiarity plays an important role, especially in European 
destinations because they generate most of their own tourist arrivals as opposed to 
developing countries.  Therefore, particularly in developing countries, efficient and 
effective, post-crisis communication and responses to restore confidence are important, 
but it also depends on a country’s crisis history (Coombe 2004) and their political 
relationships with the generating countries, which may help avoid, don’t travel warnings. 
Demonstrating an infrastructure of safety and control from evacuation, to identification, 
reparation (of casualties and fatalities) and demonstrating the ability to bring order back 
to the country can help build confidence and hence resilience (Morakabati, et al. 2016).  
There are limitations to this study from both the theoretical points of view and data 
measurement. A major problem with the in-group out-group approach is that the 
categorisation tends to be executed on the basis of observation, whereas in reality, 
such induction cannot be defended (Popper 1957). Popper (1957) argued that 
observation is selective and that one can rarely confirm anything, describing induction 
as more of a myth than a scientific approach. From the data analysis point of view, the 
countries and periods used in this analysis were determined by data availability and the 
fact that tourist arrival data were aggregate, instead of looking at nationality specific 
arrivals that could bring better light to understanding the effects on each generating 
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market. However, the initial data from Tunisia and Egypt following the terrorist attack 
suggest the hallmark of fear responses taking its toll as people chose to keep away 
rather than fly to these destinations.  
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List of tables  
Table 1: Some of the major terrorist attacks targeting westerner civilians, 2000-2016  
Attacks  Types of attack  Date Fatalities  
New York and Washington  Public transport 09.11.1 2996 
Bali (Indonesia)  Suicide and car Bomb 12.10.02 202 
Kenya* All-train vehicle 28.11.02 13 
Madrid  Public transport 11.04.04 191 
London  Suicide attack-Public transport 07.07.05 52 
Bali Suicide Bomb 01.10.05 20 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt** Truck bomb explosion 23.07.05 88 
Mumbai  Shooting and bombing attack 26.11.08 to 
29.22.08 
164 
Paris  Super market and Charlie hebdo , shooting  07.01.15 15 
Paris  Shooting and suicide attacks  13.11.15 89 
Brussels  Suicide attacks  22.03.16  32 
Total                                                                                                    3862 
              * The majority of fatalities were Israelis 











Table 2: USA, table of estimate and list of outliers  




























Standard Terms ma1  -0.6427 0.0740    
 ma2  0.1539   0.0814       
 sma1  -0.6587   0.0552       
Outlier  Terms Additive 
Outlier (AO)  
48 -0.1436 0.0352 NA5  1999:12 
 Level Shift 
(LS) 
69 -0.3203   0.0392    2.61 2.31 2001:09 
 Temporary 
Change (TC) 
70 -0.1672   0.0398   2.24 2.28 2001:10 
 Additive 
Outlier (AO) 
75 0.1253   0.0355    NA  2002:03   
 Temporary 
Change (TC) 
87 -0.1513 0.0351   2.60 2.63 2003:03 
 Level 
Shift(LS) 
109 0.2675   0.0330 3.45 3.68 2005:01   
Pre-event     3.87 3.58 2000:09 
Disappearance of 
effect   











                                                          
3 Ind= observation number 
4 Starting at the outlier event date  
5 Not interpreted as part of the event profile 
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Table 3: Bali, table of estimate and list of outliers 


























 Ar 1  0.3918 -0.4117    
Standard Terms ma1  -0.8428 -0.3282    
 sar1  -0.7644   0.1579       
 sar2  -0.3135   0.1309       
 sma1  -0.2791   0.1575       
Outlier  Terms Temporary 
Change  
46 -0.5402   0.0669    8.11 5.87 2002:10 
 Additive 
Outlier 
47 -0.9014 0.0616    3.14 5.19 2002:11 
 Additive  
Outlier 
48 -0.3191   0.0677    6.33 6.39 2002:12 
 Additive 
Outlier 
49 -0.4117   0.1215    6.08 6.69 2003:01 
 Additive 
Outlier 
50 -0.3282   0.0745    6.74 6.45 2003:02 
 Additive 
Outlier 
51 -0.4065   0.0714    7.22 5.78 2003:03 
 Temporary 
Change 
52 -0.7339 0.0721    5.38 6.09 2003:04 
 Additive 53 -0.2585    0.0531    4.79 8.03 2003:05 
 Temporary 
Change 
62 -0.2324   0.0602    8.43 9.84 2004:02 
 Level Shift 82 -0.5636 0.0518   8.11 7.32 2005:10 
 Level Shift 88 0.2047    0.0513   10.34 10.51 2006:04   
 Level Shift 95 0.2399    0.0489 11.39 11.53 2006:11   
Pre-event     9.65 8.63 2001:106 








                                                          
6 It is notable that this is right after 9/11 attack in the USA and travel disruption across the world, this figures 
seems to be down when compared to the same period in 2000. 
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Table 4: India, table of estimate and list of outliers 


























Standard Terms ma1  -0.3412   0.1361       
 ma2  -0.3846   0.1449       
 sma1  -0.5295   0.1582      
Outlier  Terms Additive 
Outlier 
26 0.1664   0.0346    NA  2008:12   
 Temporary 
Change 
36 -0.1537 0.0398 5.34 5.02 2008:12 
Pre-event     5.97 5.73 2007:12 
Disappearance of effect       3.05 3.63 2009:05 
 
 
 
